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Abstract 
The decision to buy a home is one of the most important choices faced by a household. 
Most young households who purchase a home do so using a mortgage. But mortgages 
are complex financial instruments and this complexity may be a barrier to less 
sophisticated households becoming homeowners. Using survey data from a sample of 
English and Welsh households we measure household financial literacy related to 
mortgages, including concepts such as loan duration, interest compounding and 
amortization. We find that in the population mortgage financial literacy is generally low 
and among renters mortgage financial literacy is substantially worse than among 
homeowners. Econometric estimates show mortgage financial literacy predicts home 
ownership for younger, but not for older households. Financial literacy also affects the 
type of mortgage and leverage position of younger households. Young homeowners with 
poorer financial literacy take on larger mortgage debts and are more likely to use 
alternative mortgage products. 
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1 Introduction 
 The decision to buy a family home is one of the most important financial choices made 
by households. The family home is typically the largest single durable good purchased over 
the life-cycle, for which financial and non-financial costs of adjustment can be large. It is also 
an investment asset, a source of collateral and in many cases the main component of a 
bequest. A large literature has considered the benefits arising from home ownership 
(DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Engelhardt et al., 2010; Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2013; Coulson 
and Li, 2013), including local amenities and social capital effects plus also positive effects on 
child well-being (Haurin et al., 2002) and consumption smoothing (Benito and Mumtaz, 
2009). For a review of the effects of home ownership see Dietz and Haurin (2003). 
 Given the importance of home ownership, understanding the barriers to achieving 
ownership faced by younger households is an important research topic. Younger households 
may choose not to own their homes due to their higher rates of geographic mobility coupled 
with transaction costs of moving across owner-occupied housing. Nevertheless, prior studies 
have identified a broad range of potential barriers including borrowing constraints (Haurin et 
al., 1997; Ortalo-Magné and Sven, 2006; Chambers et al., 2009; Kolodziejczyk and Leth-
Petersen, 2013), lack of mortgage market development (Sanders, 2005) and racial differences 
(Charles and Hurst, 2002; Collins and Margo, 2011). A large literature also considers the 
interplay between house price volatility, rental price volatility and income risk (Sinai and 
Souleles, 2005; Banks et al., 2016; Amior and Halket, 2014; Bostic and Lee, 2008; Diaz-
Serrano, 2005). Many government initiatives have been introduced to alleviate barriers to 
home ownership including, for example, mortgage subsidies (Fetter, 2013; Glaeser and 
Shapiro, 2003) and discounted private sales of social housing (Aalbers, 2004), though the 
long-term effects of these appear limited (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2015). However, there is 
some evidence that pre-purchase financial counseling reduces delinquency (Hirad et al., 
2001). 
 Is poor financial literacy also a barrier to home ownership? For most young households, 
an integral component of purchasing a home is a mortgage. But a mortgage is a complex 
financial product requiring a degree of financial sophistication on the part of households 
(Campbell, 2006; Bucks and Pence, 2008; Agarwal et al., 2013). Lack of financial 
understanding of mortgage products may affect younger households in particular, as they may 
lack financial experience. This might in turn go some way to explaining the age-home 
ownership gradient. Existing studies show home ownership rates increase sharply with age 
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(Haurin and Rosenthal, 2007), partly due to borrowing constraints among the young (Haurin 
et al., 1997). Lack of financial literacy may be another important constraint for younger 
households. 
 In this paper, we use a specially commissioned survey of a representative sample of 
English and Welsh households to examine whether poor financial literacy is a barrier to home 
ownership, particularly among the young. We also examine whether, conditional on home 
ownership, financial literacy affects the type of terms of mortgage products used by younger 
households. Our study is closest to that of Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006), who show that 
home ownership rates increase with real estate market knowledge among a sample of 
residents in the Columbus, Ohio area. The authors show this contributes to the racial gap in 
home ownership rates. Whereas Haurin and Morrow-Jones (2006) focus on the racial gap in 
home ownership, our study focuses on the relationship between financial literacy and the age-
home ownership gradient. Recent studies have also shown that poor financial literacy 
discourages households from participation in a range of financial markets3.  
 We measure the financial literacy of households in the domain of mortgage choice by 
inserting multiple-choice questions into our survey, encapsulating concepts of loan duration, 
interest calculation, interest compounding and loan amortization. The multiple-choice 
questions we include do not require complicated mathematical calculations, but do require an 
understanding of key economic concepts. Alongside our questions on financial literacy, we 
include a broad set of questions to capture relevant variables, which explain home ownership 
choices, including measures of income risk and credit constraints. We also consider other 
behavioral determinants of home ownership, including the role of risk attitude and time 
preferences in the form of patience and present bias4.  
 The decision to invest in understanding mortgages is itself potentially secondary to the 
decision to become a homeowner, or could be learned through mortgage market experience. 
We therefore follow recent studies in adopting an instrumental variable (IV) strategy in which 
we instrument the financial literacy index with a source of variation in financial literacy that 
pre-dates mortgage market experience. Among a range of possible instruments we use 
                                                 
3 For example, lack of understanding of the stock market and investment vehicles lowers the likelihood of 
households owning stocks (van Rooij et al., 2011b). Also, ignorance of basic financial concepts integral to re-
tirement saving discourages individuals from forming a plan for retirement saving (Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2007a). In recent research we show that financial literacy is an important determinant for choice of mortgage 
type (Gathergood and Weber, 2015). 
4 In our recent paper we show that time preferences are important for choice of mortgage type, specifically the 
choice over a standard repayment mortgage or an alternative mortgage with interest-only payments (Gathergood 
and Weber, 2015). 
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mathematical performance when young, shown to be a powerful instrument in a recent study 
by Jappelli and Padula (2013). Mathematical performance at school when young pre-dates 
housing market experience and therefore removes any learning effects through owning a 
home. However, there may be other unobserved factors pertaining to home ownership that 
correlate with our instrument, such as parental wealth and bequests. Hence, unobserved 
factors might still in part explain the relationship we find between financial literacy and home 
ownership. 
 Our results show levels of mortgage financial literacy among our sample are generally 
low. Among our whole sample comprising homeowners and renters, the average number of 
questions answered correctly is two out of four. Most respondents answer questions on loan 
duration and a simple interest calculation correctly, but only 40% show understanding of 
compound interest and less than one third answer our loan amortization question correctly. 
However, financial literacy is better among homeowners compared with renters – and this is 
true for both older and younger households. Households who score highest on the financial 
literacy index are 20 percentage points more likely to be homeowners compared with the 
lowest scoring households. In an unconditional comparison, answering one more financial 
literacy question correctly is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the likelihood of 
home ownership. 
 When we estimate econometric models, we find a clear result that financial literacy 
raises the likelihood of home ownership among younger households in our sample, but has no 
statistically significant effect on home ownership among older households. This result is 
robust to the inclusion of a broad range of controls for demographic, socio-economic and 
local housing market conditions as well as other behavioral characteristics measured at the 
individual level. We also test the sensitivity of our results to alternative sample restrictions, 
with results unchanged. To gauge the quantitative importance of financial literacy, a one-unit 
increase in financial literacy (that is answering one more of our questions correctly) increases 
the likelihood of home ownership among young households by 5.3%, an effect equivalent to 
increasing household permanent income by approximately £5,000 per year.  
 As an extension of our analysis of how financial literacy affects home ownership 
choices, in the second part of the paper we analyze the mortgage choices of young 
households. Most young households require a mortgage to become homeowners, but 
households with less understanding of mortgage products may be more exposed to taking on 
riskier mortgages, especially when young and lacking mortgage market experience. Such 
households may also be more susceptible to predatory lending practices, which tend to target 
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subprime households with lower levels of financial sophistication (Ho and Pennington-Cross, 
2006; Bond et al., 2009; Agarwal et al., 2014). For example, alternative mortgage products 
(AMPs) offer some features such as ‘interest only’ terms or slower amortization that could be 
attractive to younger households desiring to buy a home, but may not fully understand 
mortgage terms and misinterpret the short-term benefits of these products. We estimate a 
series of models in which we relate financial literacy to mortgages types (standard vs. 
alternative mortgage; fixed vs. adjustable rate) and mortgage characteristics (loan-to-value 
ratio and loan-to-income ratio). To econometrically control for selection into holding a 
mortgage, we use a selectivity correction. The selectivity correction is used together with the 
IV model to control for the endogeneity of financial literacy. 
 Results show that young mortgage homeowners with lower financial literacy make 
mortgage choices that result in holding higher levels of mortgage debt (relative to the value 
of their home and relative to their income) and use potentially riskier AMPs. These findings 
are suggestive that poor financial literacy causes households to take more risks in the 
mortgage market, though they might also reflect unobserved factors such as low wealth, 
which induce households to take AMPs. We also show that lower financial literacy increases 
the likelihood of a young household choosing to fix their mortgage interest rate and refinance 
their mortgage.  
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe our survey 
design, content and questions that comprise the financial literacy index. In Section 3 we 
present descriptive results for the relationship between financial literacy and home 
ownership. In Section 4 we present estimates from our econometric models, first models that 
explain home ownership status and second models that explain the characteristics of 
mortgages held by young households. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2 Data  
2.1 Survey Data 
 Our main data source is a cross-sectional survey of a representative sample of English 
and Welsh households into which we add supplementary questions on financial literacy and 
behavioral characteristics. The survey is conducted by the London-based market research 
firm YouGov and is known as the ‘Debt Tracker’ survey. YouGov has access to a panel of 
350,000 households and draws a sample of approximately 2,000 households for each 
 6 
quarterly wave of the Debt Tracker survey5. We use the August 2013 wave. The survey is 
administered online and achieves a representative sample by making special provision for 
respondents who do not have access to the internet.   
2.2 Core Variables and Measures of Income Volatility and Credit Constraints 
 The survey data includes a broad range of socio-economic variables including 
demographic, education and labor market variables plus detailed information on the assets 
and debt of the household6. Housing variables include housing tenure (being a homeowner 
without a mortgage, a homeowner with a mortgage, renter), the value of the main residence 
and total mortgage debt outstanding on the main residence. There is also some information on 
the terms of the mortgage, including the interest rate of the current mortgage and when the 
mortgage was refinanced the last time.  
 The data also contains measures credit constraints and income volatility. Prior studies 
have shown that these are important determinants of home ownership (Haurin et al., 1997; 
Ortalo-Magné and Sven, 2006; Chambers et al., 2009; Kolodziejczyk and Leth-Petersen, 
2013). We identify credit constrained households with a set of survey questions from which 
we create a 1/0 dummy variable to denote credit constraints. This dummy is 1 if respondents 
answer ‘yes’ to at least one of four statements that describe whether they or their partner 
cannot currently get new credit, had a credit line withdrawn, a credit line reduced or whether 
they have exceeded their credit line. A household is also classified as credit constrained if 
respondents state that applications to unsecured credit products have been turned down. We 
also construct a measure of income volatility in the sense of recent income loss. We use four 
questions to create a create a dummy variable that is 1 if the respondent states that they or 
their partner have experienced recent reductions in income arising from changes in labor or 
non-labor income or changes in employment status. 
                                                 
5 The YouGov Debt Tracker surveys a representative sample of the UK population, i.e. England, Northern Ire-
land, Scotland and Wales. Subjects are recruited from the YouGov panel, with the target sample stratified to 
represent the UK population by age, gender, home ownership and employment status. The survey achieves an 
80% response rate. Respondents are paid £10 for participation in the survey, which takes approximately 45 
minutes to complete. Further details on the survey are provided at https://yougov.co.uk/find-
solutions/reports/trackers/debt. Due to limitations with regards to the availability local level housing market 
statistics that we match into the survey, we only use English and Welsh households. We discuss regional hous-
ing data in more detail below. 
6 We construct a core set of variables including age of the household head (in approximate 10-year age brack-
ets), indicator variables for gender, marital status, whether the household includes dependent children, employ-
ment dummies (employed, unemployed, other) and dummy variable for whether the spouse or partner of the 
household head is employed. Education is measured by the age at which the household head completed full-time 
education. Financial variables include household gross annual income, total household savings in liquid prod-
ucts (excluding retirement saving) and total consumer credit debt. 
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2.3 Local Housing Market Variables 
 We match into our survey data a set of variables that describe the housing market in the 
locality of the household. A range of studies show local housing market characteristics are 
important for explaining home ownership choices (Sinai and Souleles, 2005; Banks et al., 
2016; Amior and Halket, 2014; Bostic and Lee, 2008). In total, we match five variables into 
our survey data at the local level: the regional house price to income ratio, home ownership 
rate and gross rental yield; and also at the postcode (i.e. zip code) level the 5-year house price 
growth rate and standard deviation of mean house prices7. 
2.4 Mortgage Financial Literacy Questions 
 The main innovation in our study is the set of bespoke questions we added to measure 
financial literacy and behavioral characteristics. Our first set of questions comprises four 
questions that measure the ‘mortgage financial literacy’ of respondents. We follow the 
convention in studies of financial literacy by inserting short multiple-choice questions with 
objective answers, such as those used in studies on consumer credit and debt (Lusardi and 
Tufano, 2009; Disney and Gathergood, 2013) retirement saving (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a, 
2007b; van Rooij et al., 2011a) and stock market participation (Guiso and Jappelli, 2005; van 
Rooij et al., 2011b).  
 A commonality across these studies is that the measure of financial literacy employed in 
the analysis allows the researcher to judge better and worse levels of financial understanding 
against objective criteria. Our financial literacy questions are specifically related to mortgage 
products. We focus on mortgages because our central interest is whether individuals do not 
become homeowners due to a lack of understanding of the mortgage market – engagement 
that is essential for nearly all households looking to become homeowners. 
 The four questions we design test respondents’ understanding of a set of concepts that are 
integral to understanding the functioning of a mortgage. The first question tests whether the 
respondent understands that, ceteris paribus, the total cost of a mortgage is increasing with its 
duration. The second question requires a simple interest calculation. These two questions 
                                                 
7 The first three variables are regional due to availability of income and rental price data (nine English and 
Welsh regions), the other two variables are more granular to the postcode district level (84 England and Wales 
postcode districts). First, we calculate the house price to average income ratio in the region where the household 
is resident using house price data taken from the UK’s official house price sales index and income data from the 
UK Office for National Statistics. Second, we match in the regional home ownership rate from UK Census data. 
Third, we match a measure of the average simple gross rental yield in the region of residence calculated by the 
financial consulting agency BM Solutions. For each household in our data we match in a 5-year house price 
index at the postcode district level based on official sales data from the England and Wales land registry. Using 
these data, we calculate the 5-year growth rate and 5-year standard deviation of mean house prices. 
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together test whether respondents grasp the most basic features of a loan product. The third 
question tests understanding of compound finance8. The question is constructed in such a way 
that a respondent who understands the concept of compounding can identify the correct 
answer using elimination of incorrect answers using very basic math. The fourth question, 
which is the most challenging question, tests whether individuals can identify the 
amortization profile of a mortgage.  
 Each question was framed in the context of a particular dimension of typical mortgage 
contracts. Respondents could view multiple-choice answers to each question on screen in the 
online survey and were asked to select one answer from the set of available answers. The four 
questions (with the correct answer shown in italics) are: 
1. Suppose a 15 year mortgage and a 30 year mortgage have the same Annual 
Percentage Rate and the same amount borrowed. The total amount repaid will be: 
a. Higher for the 15 year mortgage; b. Higher for the 30 year mortgage;  
c. The total amount repaid on both mortgages will be the same; d. Don’t know 
 
2. Suppose you owe £50,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 6%. If you 
didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total after 
one year? 
a. Less than £50,000; b. £50,000 - £54,999; c. £55,000 - £59,999;  
d. £60,000 - £64,999; e. More than £65,000; f. Don’t know 
 
3. Suppose you owe £100,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If 
you didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total 
after five years? 
a. Less than £120,000; b. Between £120,000 and £125,000;  
c. More than £125,000; d. Don’t know 
 
4. Suppose you owe £200,000 on a mortgage with an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If 
you made annual payments of £10,000 per year how long would it take to repay the 
whole mortgage? 
a. Less than 20 years; b. Between 20 and 30 years; c. Between 30 and 40 
years; d. The mortgage would never be repaid; e. Don’t know 
 From answers to the four questions we sum the number of correct answers to create a 
five-point financial literacy score, ranging from zero to four9.  
                                                 
8 Importantly, the question does not require the respondent to make a compound interest calculation, which 
would be mathematically challenging, especially in a survey setting. 
9 We initially treat “don’t know” as an incorrect answer. In our robustness analysis in Section 4 we show that 
our results are not sensitive to these “don’t know” respondents. 
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 There are a number of reasons to think that financial literacy is endogenous to home 
ownership. Financial literacy may be correlated with individual characteristics we do not 
directly observe that also affect home ownership (such as parental income) and other 
elements of an individual’s financial situation (such as inherited wealth). In addition, there 
may be reverse causality between housing tenure and financial literacy. Purchasing a home 
via a mortgage may cause individuals to gain financial literacy as they learn about their 
mortgage contract. Estimations that do not control for correlated errors typically 
underestimate the effect of financial literacy on economic outcomes (Christiansen et al., 
2008; Behrman et al., 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b). 
 Consequently, we adopt an IV regression model in which we instrument the respondent’s 
financial literacy score. An ideal instrument should contain an exogenous source of variation 
in financial literacy that is unrelated to housing tenure. A wide variety of instruments are used 
in the literature, including parental education background (van Rooij et al., 2011b) and 
whether the respondent studied economics or finance in school (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009).  
 We had the opportunity to include an additional survey question for use as an instrument 
for financial literacy. Our choice was guided by Jappelli and Padula (2013), who review and 
test 11 instruments employed in the prior literature. They find only a subset of instruments 
pass the ‘weak instruments’ test of Stock and Yogo (2005) and conclude that the ideal 
instrument would be an individual’s financial literacy measured before they entered labor and 
financial markets, that is before they made selective choices over financial behaviors that 
could give rise to a channel for reverse causality.  
 Pre-market financial literacy is typically unobserved, hence Jappelli and Padula (2013) 
suggest early-life mathematical ability as a proxy, specifically mathematical performance in 
primary school10. This instrument itself does have limitations: average ability will vary across 
schools with socio-economic factors and math performance may correlate with unobserved 
factors affecting home ownership apart from the formation of future financial literacy. 
 We adopt their survey question, which is as follows: 
- When you were at primary school aged 10, how did you perform in maths compared 
to other children in your class? 
a. Much better than average; b. Better than average; c. About the same as 
average; d. Worse than average; e. Much worse than average 
                                                 
10 The exact question used by Jappelli and Padula (2013) is: “Now I would like you to think back to your time in 
school when you were 10 years old. How did you perform in Maths compared to other children in your class? 
Did you perform much better, better, about the same, worse or much worse than the average?” 
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 In the UK education system, 10 is the age before high school entry and hence before 
students are able to self-select into subjects of interest. From answers to this question we 
create a math level score ranging from one (‘much worse’) to five (‘much better’).  
2.5 Behavioral Characteristics Questions 
 Behavioral characteristics other than financial literacy may be important for home 
ownership decisions and we add an additional set of questions into our survey that measure 
those. We focus on two characteristics: time preferences and risk attitude.  
 Time preference may be an important factor in determining home ownership decisions. 
Saving for down payments to meet lending criteria involves postponing non-housing 
consumption. We measure two aspects of time preference in the survey. First, we include a 
measure of patience using a short question developed by Dohmen et al. (2010)11. The 
statement to proxy patience reads: 
- “How do you see yourself: are you generally an impatient person, or someone who 
always shows great patience? Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with 0 
referring to ‘very impatient’ and 10 to ‘very patient’.” 
 Second, we include a measure of present bias. Recent studies have used survey measures 
of time preference to show that patience and present bias are important for a range of 
household outcomes including saving (Ameriks et al., 2007), human capital accumulation 
(Cadena and Keys, 2015) and behavior among adolescents (Sutter et al., 2013). We include 
separate measures of patience and present bias to distinguish between behaviors that might 
arise due to these different aspects of time preference12.  
 We elicit present bias using a question in which respondents associate or disassociate 
themselves with a short statement describing ‘impulsive’ consumption behavior on a five 
point Likert scale from ‘agree strongly’ to ‘disagree strongly’. The statement is: 
- “I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really afford them.”  
 The final behavioral characteristic we measure in our survey is attitude to risk, which has 
                                                 
11 The authors insert this measure of patience into the German Socio-Economic Panel to investigate the relation 
between risk attitude, patience and cognitive ability. Vischer et al. (2013) use incentivized time preference elici-
tation methods on the same survey subject pool as in Dohmen et al. (2010) and find answers to the survey ques-
tion closely match those of experimental methods. 
12 How does present bias differ from patience? In models of intertemporal choice, the distinction is made be-
tween the rate at which an individual discounts future consumption (‘patience’) and whether the individual ex-
hibits a bias towards immediate consumption (‘present bias’). A common representation of present bias prefer-
ences is the -  model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laibson, 1997). 
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been shown to be an important component of home ownership choices (Diaz-Serrano, 2005). 
We adopt the methodology of recent studies by including a proxy question in our survey. The 
question we use to measure risk aversion is developed and tested by Dohmen et al. (2011), 
who show survey answers correlate closely with measured risk preferences in experimental 
lab tasks. The question is:  
- “How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the 
value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully prepared to 
take risks’.” 
 
3 Summary Data Differences between Owners and Renters, Young and Old 
3.1 Socio-Economic, Financial and Locality Characteristics  
 Table 1 presents summary statistics for the socio-economic characteristics of sample. The 
sample comprises 1,205 households. In the sample, 65% of households are homeowners who 
either own their home with or without a mortgage13. Homeowners and renters differ as 
expected in average socio-economic characteristics. Homeowners are typically older, more 
likely to have a male household head and are more likely to be married and have children. 
Renters on average report a slightly higher age at which they left full-time education, partly 
reflecting cohort differences in the prevalence of college and university education (renters are 
on average younger than homeowners). Homeowners are more likely to be employed and 
have a partner or spouse in employment. 
 Financial characteristics of owners and renters also differ in patterns similar to those 
found in previous studies. Average household income is higher among owners by 
approximately 49%. Owners and renters have very similar average levels of consumer credit 
debt. Non-pension savings are much higher among owners compared with renters. For 
homeowners, the average self-reported property value in the data is £216,100. The average 
value of mortgage debt among homeowners is approximately £77,800. 
 Further summary data on local housing market characteristics related to home ownership 
are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Summary data shows renters typically live in 
                                                 
13 The full survey sample comprises approximately 1,600 households. We exclude retired households from the 
analysis. The home ownership rate in our sample is nearly identical to the aggregate England and Wales 66% 
home ownership rate (Source: UK Office for National Statistics). 
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localities where house prices are on average higher (relative to income), rents are lower 
(relative to house prices) and house prices are more variable. Renters also live in localities 
where the 5-year standard deviation of mean house prices is considerably higher. These 
variables are important control variables in our regression analysis. 
3.2 Mortgage Financial Literacy 
 Summary data for responses to the financial literacy questions are shown in Table 2. 
Overall, the pattern of correct responses to the questions confirms our hypothesis that the 
questions are increasing in difficulty. 70% of respondents answered the first question 
correctly and a little over half did so for the second question. The third and fourth questions, 
which test understanding of more complex concepts of interest compounding and balancing 
accrued interest against pay-downs, have much lower correct response rates. Approximately 
40% of respondents answer Question 3 correctly and less than one third answer Question 4 
correctly. The average literacy score of the sample, the sum of number of correct answers, is 
1.97.  
 Most wrong answers are due to respondents choosing an incorrect option and are not due 
to high rates of respondents answering “don’t know” (which could indicate respondents 
disengaged with our survey questions). In the whole sample, 17% of respondents answered 
“don’t know” to the first question. For later questions, the proportions of respondents 
answering “don’t know” increases, but accounts for only part of the reduction in correct 
answers. Between questions one and four the proportion of respondents choosing the correct 
answer falls by 40 percentage points. The proportion of respondents choosing “don’t know” 
increases by 12 percentage points. Therefore, at a maximum, “don’t know” answers chosen 
due to disengagement with the survey could account for only one third of the increase in 
incorrect answers between the beginning and the end of the financial literacy questions 
module14.  
 Homeowners do much better in answering the financial literacy questions on average. 
The mean literacy score among homeowners is 2.13, compared with 1.69 among renters – a 
difference of 0.44 points equivalent to a 26% lower financial literacy of renters. For each 
question, the proportion of correct answers is higher for homeowners than for renters, with 
both groups showing the same pattern of higher proportions of correct responses to the earlier 
                                                 
14 Later in our econometric analysis, we test the sensitivity of our findings to potentially disengaged respondents 
by excluding those who answered “don’t know” to the first question or those who answered with “don’t know” 
to three or more questions. 
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questions compared with the later questions.  
3.3 Behavioral Characteristics 
 Summary data for the set of survey questions measuring behavioral characteristics are 
shown in Table 3. In our whole sample the average self-reported degree on patience is 5.70 
on a scale of 0-10 (10 meaning ‘very patient’) with a median of 6.00 and a standard deviation 
of 2.56. This indicates respondents neither tend to self-identify as particularly patient or 
impatient. Respondents tend to be slightly more risk averse, with a sample mean of 4.42 (10 
meaning ‘fully prepared to take risks’). In the whole sample, respondents tend to strongly 
disassociate themselves to our measure of present bias. Only 14% of respondents tend to 
agree or agree strongly that they are impulsive in their spending behavior.  
 A comparison of homeowners and renters indicates only a small difference in the degree 
of patience. Homeowners self-report as, on average, being slightly less patient (5.62 
compared with 5.85), though this difference is small compared with the standard deviation of 
around 2.5. The difference between groups with regards to risk attitude is similarly small: 
homeowners are slightly more risk averse (4.31) than renters (4.60). Among renters, a higher 
proportion, 19%, self-identify as present biased, compared with 12% of home owners. 
3.4 Differences between Young and Old 
 Next, we show unconditional differences between owners and renters across young and 
old age groups. As we show later in our econometric analysis, we find large differences in the 
relationship between financial literacy and home ownership across young and old groups. 
Table 4 summarizes differences between owners and renters for a range of financial variables, 
financial literacy questions and behavioral characteristics. P-values from t-tests for the 
equivalence of mean value of home owners and renters within each age group are reported in 
the table. 
 The summary data shows owners and renters differ in many characteristics in both young 
and old groups: owners have, on average, higher income, liquid savings and are less likely to 
be credit constrained. Owners also show higher average literacy scores. However, there are 
also differences in the comparisons between young and old households. Compared with 
young renters, young home owners are less likely to have suffered a recent income loss, show 
on average less willingness to take risks, lower self-reported patience and are less likely to 
identify as present biased. Differences in these variables are not statistically significant 
between old home owners and renters. Hence these results suggest some heterogeneity in the 
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differing characteristics of home owners and renters across young and old age groups.  
4 Econometric Models and Estimation 
 Our main interest is to estimate the effects of financial literacy on home ownership. The 
summary statistics suggest financial literacy positively relates to home ownership for both 
young and old households. Our regression analysis allows us to control for a range of 
covariates and also to control for the potential endogeneity of financial literacy to home 
ownership. 
 We first describe the empirical model of home ownership. The baseline econometric 
model we estimate is a probit model in which the dependent variable is a 1/0 dummy that 
takes a value of 1 if the household is a homeowner and a value of 0 if the household is a 
renter15. We include a wide range of covariates incorporating local housing market 
characteristics ( ), behavioral characteristics ( ) and our financial literacy index ( ). The 
vector  includes a broad range of socio-economic controls. The model we estimate is then 
written as:  
  (1) 
where  is the cumulative normal distribution. We estimate the model by maximum 
likelihood and calculate average marginal effects which we report in the results. 
 As discussed above, the performance of survey respondents in our financial literacy 
questions may arise endogenously with home ownership choices. Therefore, we instrument 
observed financial literacy using our measure of early-life mathematical ability following 
Jappelli and Padula (2013). We do so using a two-equation model in which the relation 
between financial literacy and mathematical ability is estimated by the equation: 
  (2) 
where  denotes the variable in our survey data which measures self-reported 
mathematical performance at school on a five-point scale. Equation 2 includes all the 
covariates that enter in Equation 1. We use an IV probit model that jointly estimates both 
equations using a maximum likelihood estimator. We acknowledge that this approach does 
not control for all forms of endogeneity and that unobserved factors might still in part explain 
the relationship we find between financial literacy and home ownership. 
                                                 
15 We first estimate our models with a sample that classifies all respondents who own a home without a mort-
gage and those with a mortgage as ‘homeowners’. We later show that our results are robust to excluding home-
owners without mortgages. 
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4.1 Home ownership IV Probit Results 
 Results from our baseline model are shown in Table 5. We show results for all 
households and for sub-samples of younger and older households. Our instrument performs 
strongly in the first-stage of the two-stage model (results from the first-stage model are 
shown in Appendix Table A2). The instrument is statistically significant in all specifications 
at the 0.1% level. Our econometric model has a single endogenous regressor and a single 
instrument, so following Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005) we evaluate 
the F-statistic from the first-stage models, which are higher than a value of 10 in each case 
and higher than the critical values at the 5% significance level provided by Stock and Yogo 
(2005). 
 Results from the second stage show the set of covariates in our model relate to home 
ownership in keeping with findings from the prior literature. The probability of home 
ownership increases with income among both younger and older households, but there is a 
concave home ownership gradient in income as low income households are much less likely 
to be homeowners. The coefficients on the income loss and credit constrained dummy 
variables are both negative, implying households who are captured by these dummy variables 
are less likely to be homeowners16. Among regional housing market variables, the 
coefficients on the 5-year growth and standard deviation of house prices are both significant 
at the 1% level, as is the local house price to average income ratio. The marginal effects 
imply a strong negative relationship between the level and volatility of house prices and the 
likelihood of home ownership17.  
 Turning to our main interest, results in Column 1 show the coefficient on the financial 
literacy score is positive and weakly statistically significant at the 10% level. The marginal 
effect of 0.022 implies a one standard deviation increase in the financial literacy score (1.97 
units) raises the likelihood of home ownership by 4.3 percentage points. Evaluated against a 
baseline predicted probably of 0.647 this is a 6.5% increase in likelihood.  
 However, results in Columns 2 and 3 show that financial literacy is important for home 
ownership only among the young. The coefficient on the financial literacy score is positive 
                                                 
16 The coefficient on the recent income loss dummy is statistically significant at the 10% level and the coeffi-
cient on the credit constrained dummy is significant at the 1% level. The marginal effect on the credit con-
strained dummy coefficient takes a value of -0.124, which implies a credit constrained household is 12.4 per-
centage points less likely to own a home. Against a baseline probability of 70% this is an 18% reduction in the 
likelihood of home ownership due to credit constraints. 
17 A one-unit increase in the house price to income ratio lowers the likelihood of home ownership by 12 per-
centage points. A one standard deviation increase in house price volatility lowers the likelihood of home owner-
ship by 2.7 percentage points. The coefficient on the 5-year growth of house prices is positive and highly signif-
icant, implying individuals are more likely to own homes in localities with stronger house price growth.  
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and statistically significant at the 1% level of the sample of young households but statistically 
not significant for the sample of old households. Given the lower home ownership rate 
among young households, the implied effect of a one-unit increase in financial literacy (1.36 
units) is to raise the home ownership rate among young households by (0.027/0.513) = 5.3%. 
To compare this effect size, the equivalent increase in income among young households 
required to raise home ownership by 5.3% is approximately £5,000 per year.  
 Results in Columns 2 and 3 also show our measure of present bias is important for home 
ownership decisions of young, but not old, households. The coefficient on the present bias 
dummy variable is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The coefficient 
magnitude implies a household that reports present bias is 8.7pp less likely to be a home 
owner, or a 17% reduction. However, with only 17% of young households reporting present 
bias a one-unit increase is a very large change within the sample.  
4.2 Home ownership IV Probit Sensitivity Tests 
 We have undertaken sensitivity tests for our IV specification. Results are potentially 
sensitive to the inclusion of “don’t know” answers, which might indicate households were 
disengaged from part of our survey. Coding these answers as ‘incorrect’ might introduce 
misclassification bias into our estimates. Therefore, in Table 6 we re-estimate the IV Probit 
models excluding observations where respondents answered “don’t know” to the first 
question (the easiest question), or answered at least three questions with “don’t know”. This 
removes 279 observations from our sample, but the pattern of results is unchanged. In the 
whole sample the financial literacy variable remains positive, but its statistical significant is 
now below the 10% level. However, the coefficient estimate remains statistically significant 
at the 1% level among the sample of young households, but is not different from zero for 
older households. The marginal effect implies a slightly higher proportionate effect of a one-
unit increase in the financial literacy score of (0.035/0.515) = 6.8%. We also test the 
sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of home owners without mortgages in Appendix 
Table A3. Results there also show the same pattern that financial literacy is important for 
home ownership among the young sample, but unrelated to home ownership among the old 
sample. 
4.3 Financial Literacy and Mortgage Characteristics of Young Households 
 In this section, we investigate how financial literacy affects the mortgage choices of 
households. Results from the previous section show that poor financial literacy lowers the 
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likelihood of younger households owning their homes. However, even among young 
homeowners, poor financial literacy might affect mortgage choices. Households with less 
understanding of mortgage products may be more exposed to taking on riskier mortgages. For 
example, AMPs offer some features such as ‘interest only’ terms or slower amortization, 
which could be attractive to households who do not fully understand mortgage terms and 
misinterpret the initial benefits of these products. 
 To investigate this, we use additional data from our survey that relates to the 
characteristics of the mortgage taken on by the household. We construct various measures of 
the household’s mortgage position: i) the loan-to-value ratio, calculated as the total value of 
the mortgage principal divided by the house value; ii) the loan-to-income ratio, calculated as 
the total value of the mortgage principal divided by annual household income, iii) an 
indicator variable for whether the household has recently refinanced their mortgage within 
the last three years; and indicator variables for whether the mortgage held by the household is 
iv) an AMP instead of a standard mortgage product and v) an adjustable rate mortgage instead 
of a fixed rate mortgage. We classify a mortgage product as a standard mortgage if the 
monthly repayments cover the interest and principal such that the mortgage amortizes over a 
defined lifetime. In the UK, these are known as ‘capital repayment’ mortgages. We classify a 
mortgage product as an alternative mortgage is the initial payment only covers the interest 
due, or less than the interest due (negative amortization). In our sample, among the 339 
younger home owners, 27% refinanced within the past 3 years, 15% hold an AMP and 44% 
hold an adjustable rate mortgage (Table 4). 
 Using this set of outcome variables, we estimate a variety of econometric models. Our 
econometric models address two forms of endogeneity. First, the performance of survey 
respondents in our financial literacy questions may arise endogenously with mortgage 
choices (as with home ownership choices). Therefore, we instrument financial literacy 
following the IV strategy used in the models for home ownership above. Second, we only 
observe mortgage choices for households who use a mortgage to buy a home. In our sample, 
91% of young home owners hold a mortgage, but nevertheless there is potential selection bias 
if financial literacy is related to the decision to use a mortgage to buy a home instead of 
making a purchase without a mortgage. To address this problem, we use a selectivity 
correction model where the local house price to income ratio is included as an exclusion 
restriction. This exclusion restriction is used on the basis that higher house prices in the 
locality relative to individual incomes make it more likely that a young household will 
require a mortgage to fund their home purchase. 
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 The resulting econometric model, therefore, involves a selectivity correction equation 
that predicts whether the household holds a mortgage and an IV correction for the financial 
literacy score of the household. This ‘hybrid’ approach is implemented by calculating the 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) from the selection equation and including it as an additional 
covariate in the IV models (see Amemiya, 1985, for a discussion of this econometric 
approach).  
The basic Heckman selectivity correction probit model for mortgage borrowing with 
sample correction can be written as: 
 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 = 1[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑙 + 𝐗
′𝛽 + 𝑢 > 0] 
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑙 + 𝛽1𝑙ℎ𝑝𝑖 + 𝐗′𝜔 + 𝑣 > 0] 
(3) 
(4) 
where (4) is the sample selection equation. We use equation (3) with the five different binary 
outcome variables for mortgage characteristics described above18. The binary outcome varia-
bles describing mortgage characteristics are only observed when 𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 1. 𝑓𝑙 
is the continuous measure of financial literacy and 𝐗′ a vector of demographic and financial 
control variables. 𝑙ℎ𝑝𝑖 is the local house price to income ratio and is included as the exclu-
sion restriction for the selectivity correction. The two equations are jointly estimated using 
maximum likelihood. 
 The hybrid of a Heckman selectivity correction model and an IV probit model and can 
then be written as: 
 𝑓𝑙 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝑅 + 𝐗
′𝛽 + 𝜀 
𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑔𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 = 1[𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑀𝑅 + 𝐗′𝛽 + 𝜇 > 0] 
(5) 
(6) 
where 𝑚𝑎𝑡ℎ is the level of math whilst in school, which we use as instrument for financial 
literacy as in Equations 1 and 2. 𝐼𝑀𝑅 is the ‘Inverse Mills Ratio’, which is the sample selec-
tion correction term of the Heckman selectivity correction19. This means that this hybrid ap-
proach is implemented by calculating the inverse mills ratio from the selection equation (4) 
and including it as an additional covariate in an IV probit model. Equations 5 and 6 are then 
jointly estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. 
                                                 
18 We transform the continuous loan-to-value (ltv) ratio to a binary variable that is 1 when the ltv of the house-
hold is larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. The loan-to-income ratio (lti) of the household is simi-
larly transformed to a binary variable that is one if lti is larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. 
19 The 𝐼𝑀𝑅 or ‘hazard rate’ is the ratio of the probability density function and the cumulative distribution func-
tion evaluated at the predicted outcomes of (4), divided by the standard error of (4). 
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4.4 Mortgage Characteristics IV – Heckman Estimates 
 Table 7 shows results for the models where the outcome variables are the loan-to-value 
ratio (Column 1) and loan-to-income ratio (Column 2). In both models the coefficient on the 
IMR is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies the selectivity 
correction is significant in the regression: if we fail to correct for selection into holding a 
mortgage the coefficient slopes would be flatter and the betas underestimated. In the IV 
component of the model the coefficient on the instrument for financial literacy (the financial 
education at school index) is statistically significant at the 1% level, with an F-statistic from 
the regression of 24.660. 
 Results show the coefficient on the instrumented financial literacy score is negative and 
significant at the 1% level in Column 1 and at the 5% level in Column 2. The negative 
coefficient values imply a young household with better financial literacy, conditional upon 
holding a mortgage, will hold a mortgage with lower mortgage debt (relative to the value of 
the house and relative to their income). The coefficient values imply a 1 unit increase in the 
financial literacy score lowers the probability of the household holding a high loan-to-value 
ratio by 1.6pp, or (0.016/0.213) = 7.5%. The same increase in financial literacy lowers the 
probability of the household holding a high loan-to-income ratio by 1.1pp or (0.011/0.155) = 
7.1%.  
 To test the sensitivity of our results to the econometric specification used, we have also 
estimated models which exclude the selectivity correction, but retain the instrument for 
financial literacy (results are shown in Table A4). Therefore, in these specifications we 
estimate the effect of financial literacy on mortgage characteristics, conditional upon holding 
a mortgage. In those models the implied effect of a one-unit increase in financial literacy is to 
lower the probability of holding a high loan-to-value ratio by 2.6% and the probability of 
holding a high loan-to-income ratio by 7.1%. Hence, while it is important to control for 
selection into mortgage holding, our results are not sensitive to this econometric setup. 
 Why do we observe a negative effect of financial literacy on the level of household debt? 
One explanation is that our instrument may be correlated with unobserved factors which 
cause the household to have lower debt, such as individual- or parental wealth, which we 
cannot control for directly in our econometric model. An alternative explanation is that less 
financially literate mortgage holders are steered towards higher leverage products which are 
more profitable to lenders. We find no evidence that financial literacy increases leverage, 
which would be the case if young homeowners were purchasing housing for investment 
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returns and seeking to maximize the value of their home purchase through higher debt. 
 Results from the models in Table 8 further show that financial literacy is important for 
characteristics of the mortgage product used and also for household refinancing behavior. In 
Column 1 the outcome variable is whether the household refinanced their mortgage in the 
past 3 years. The results show the coefficient on the financial literacy score is negative and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The negative value implies households with higher 
financial literacy scores are less likely to have recently refinanced their mortgage – a one-unit 
increase in the financial literacy score implies a (0.015/0.134) = 12% reduction in the 
likelihood of a recent refinance. This might appear puzzling, as in the US mortgage market 
failure to refinance is often considered a sign of financial illiteracy (for example, see Deng et 
al., 2000). However, in the UK context the benefits of regular mortgage refinancing are more 
ambiguous as most mortgages are adjustable rate mortgages with short-term teaser rate 
discounts. More literate mortgage holders may be less likely to take short-term deals and in 
doing so avoid regularly paying refinancing fees.  
 Results in Columns 2 and 3 also show statistically significant effects of financial literacy. 
The coefficient on the financial literacy variables in the model for holding an AMP (instead 
of a standard repayment mortgage) in Column 2 is negative and statistically significant at the 
5% level. The marginal effect implies a one-unit increase in financial literacy lowers the 
likelihood of holding an AMP by (0.042/0.072) = 58% and raises the likelihood of holding an 
adjustable rate mortgage (instead of a fixed rate mortgage) by (0.020/0.224) = 8.9% in 
Column 3. We obtain similar results in most models if we estimate a model which excludes 
the selectivity correction, but retains the instrument for financial literacy. The implied effects 
of a one-unit increase in financial literacy are to lower the likelihood of recent refinancing by 
6.3% (though the marginal effect is no longer statistically significant in this model), lower the 
likelihood of holding an AMP by 47.3% and raise the likelihood of holding an adjustable rate 
mortgage by 6.1%. Full results are shown in Table A5.  
 We have undertaken further sensitivity analysis for the models with selectivity 
correction, with results reported in Appendix Tables A6 and A7. When we remove “don’t 
know” answers from the sample the pattern of results remains unchanged for the loan-to-
value and loan-to-income models (Table A6) and the models for mortgage refinancing, 
mortgage repayment type and interest rate type (Table A7).  
 Taken together these results show financial literacy is important for the mortgage choices 
of young households. It is perhaps concerning that households with lower financial literacy 
take on more debt and are more likely to use alternative products that require foresight and 
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future decisions on the part of the household (unlike standard mortgages that amortize in the 
background). We cannot conclude that households are making ‘bad’ choices, but instead 
interpret these results cautiously. Prior work has identified that pre-mortgage counseling can 
reduce delinquency (Hirad et al., 2001), potentially by raising households’ awareness of the 
riskiness of some mortgage products. 
5 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we use a specially commissioned bespoke consumer survey covering a 
representative sample of households in England and Wales to examine the relationship 
between financial literacy and home ownership. Financial literacy may be particularly 
important for explaining the age-home ownership gradient. We use four financial literacy 
questions together with a broad range of control variables and measures of behavioral 
characteristics and estimate instrumental variable probit models that explain home ownership 
status and also a range of models that explain mortgage choices. Our instrumental variable 
strategy addresses the potential endogeneity of financial literacy to mortgage market 
behavior. However, there may be other unobserved factors pertaining to home ownership that 
correlate with our instrument, such as parental wealth and bequests. Hence, unobserved 
factors might still in part explain the relationship we find. 
 Our results show that financial literacy is important for home ownership among the 
younger households but not for older households, consistent with financial literacy being an 
important determinant of the timing of transition into home ownership. Further results show 
financial literacy affects mortgage choices of the young, which may have important longer-
term effects on the financial positions of young households entering the mortgage market. 
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics, Mean Values (Median Values)
(1) (2) (3)
Full
Sample Homeowner Renter
Age
18–34 (= 1) 0.29 0.18 0.49
35–44 (= 1) 0.24 0.26 0.21
45–54 (= 1) 0.24 0.29 0.16
55+ (= 1) 0.23 0.28 0.14
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.48 0.49 0.46
Married/living as married (= 1) 0.64 0.76 0.42
Dependent children (= 1) 0.28 0.31 0.21
Math level in school (1–5) 3.60 3.59 3.61
Education leaving age (years) 18.86 18.81 18.94
Employment
Employed (= 1) 0.79 0.85 0.68
Unemployed (= 1) 0.03 0.02 0.07
Student/Housewife/Disabled (= 1) 0.18 0.13 0.25
Spouse employed (= 1) 0.48 0.59 0.29
Household Finances
Household income (£) 36700 41500 27900
(32400) (36000) (25000)
Consumer credit debt (£) 2300 2400 2000
(0) (0) (0)
Liquid savings (£) 8500 11300 3500
(0) (0) (0)
Property value (£) 139700 216100 0
(110000) (180000) (0)
Mortgage outstanding amount (£) 50300 77800 0
(0) (62000) (0)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.16 0.14 0.18
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.08 0.04 0.14
Observations 1205 779 426
Note: Table shows summary statistics for all individuals in the survey (Col-
umn 1), plus for all individuals divided into two mutually exclusive and
exhaustive groups: those owning a home (either with or without a mort-
gage) in Column 2 and those renting in Column 3. The variable ‘math level
in school’ is the individual’s self-reported mathematical ability at school on
a scale from 1 (much worse than average) to 5 (much better than average).
Mean values reported, medians in parentheses for nancial variables.
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Table 2: Mortgage Literacy Performance
(1) (2) (3)
Full
Sample Homeowner Renter
1. Suppose a 15 year mortgage and a 30 year mortgage have the same Annual Percentage
Rate and the same amount borrowed. The total amount repaid will be:
Higher for the 15 year mortgage 0.04 0.04 0.04
Higher for the 30 year mortgage 0.70 0.75 0.61
The total amount repaid will be the same 0.09 0.08 0.12
Do not know 0.17 0.13 0.23
2. Suppose you owe £50,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 6%. If you didn’t
make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total after one year?
Less than £50,000 0.03 0.03 0.04
£50,000 – £54,999 0.56 0.60 0.49
£55,000 – £59,999 0.13 0.13 0.14
£60,000 – £64,999 0.02 0.02 0.03
More than £65,000 0.04 0.04 0.03
Do not know 0.22 0.19 0.27
3. Suppose you owe £100,000 on a mortgage at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If you
didn’t make any payments on this mortgage how much would you owe in total after ve
years?
Less than £120,000 0.14 0.14 0.15
Between £120,000 and £125,000 0.22 0.21 0.23
More than £125,000 0.42 0.46 0.34
Do not know 0.22 0.19 0.27
4. Suppose you owe £200,000 on a mortgage with at an Annual Percentage Rate of 5%. If you
made annual payments of £10,000 per year how long would it take to repay the whole
mortgage?
Less than 20 years 0.03 0.02 0.03
Between 20 and 30 years 0.27 0.28 0.24
Between 30 and 40 years 0.11 0.11 0.13
The mortgage would never be repaid 0.30 0.32 0.25
Do not know 0.29 0.26 0.35
Literacy score (0–4) 1.97 2.13 1.69
Observations 1205 779 426
Note: Table shows breakdown of answers to nancial literacy questions by proportion of respon-
dents choosing each answer. Correct answers in italics. Column 1 shows statistics for whole
sample, Column 2 for homeowners only and Column 3 for renters only.
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Table 3: Behavioral Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Full
Sample Homeowner Renter
Patience: “Are you generally an impatient person, or someone who always shows great patience?
Answers are coded on an 11-point scale, with ‘0’ referring to ‘very impatient’ and ‘10’ to ‘very patient’.”
Patience (0–10) 5.70 5.62 5.85
(6.00) (6.00) (6.00)
[2.56] [2.61] [2.47]
Risk attitude: “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid
taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the
value 10 means: ‘fully prepared to take risks’.”
Risk attitude (0–10) 4.42 4.31 4.60
(5.00) (4.00) (5.00)
[2.33] [2.30] [2.39]
Present biased: “I am impulsive and tend to buy things even when I can’t really aord them.”
Agree strongly 0.03 0.02 0.04
Tend to agree 0.12 0.10 0.15
Neither agree nor disagree 0.20 0.19 0.20
Tend to disagree 0.30 0.30 0.30
Disagree strongly 0.33 0.36 0.27
Don’t know 0.03 0.02 0.04
Present biased (= 1)a 0.14 0.12 0.19
Observations 1205 779 426
a ‘Present biased’ = 1 if answer ‘agree strongly’ or ‘tend to agree’, and = 0 otherwise.
Note: Table shows breakdown of answers to behavioral characteristics questions by proportion of respondents
choosing each answer. Column 1 shows statistics for whole sample, Column 2 for homeowners only and
Column 3 for renters only. Mean values reported, medians in parentheses and standard deviations in square
brackets.
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Table 4: Characteristics of Young vs. Old Households, Mean Values (Median Values)
Young Households Old Households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Homeowner Renter p-values Homeowner Renter p-values
Household Finances
Household income (£) 46318 30375 0.000 37756 22092 0.000
(40000) (26906) (34000) (20000)
Consumer credit debt (£) 2648 1773 0.073 2208 2457 0.727
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Liquid savings (£) 8136 4013 0.008 13710 2355 0.000
(0) (0) (0) (0)
Mortgage Characteristics
Property value (£) 198840 0 — 229322 0 —
(165000) (0) (190000) (0)
Mortgage outstanding amount (£) 118620 0 — 46360 0 —
(105000) (0) (20000) (0)
Renanced within past 3 years (= 1) 0.27 0.00 — 0.08 0.00 —
Alternative Mortgage Product (AMP) 0.15 0.00 — 0.15 0.00 —
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) 0.44 0.00 — 0.32 0.00 —
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.10 0.17 0.004 0.17 0.20 0.573
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.04 0.15 0.000 0.05 0.12 0.003
Financial Literacy
Education leaving age (years) 19.60 19.77 0.419 18.20 17.00 0.000
Math level in school (1–5) 3.69 3.71 0.771 3.52 3.35 0.116
Financial literacy score (0–4) 2.21 1.75 0.000 2.07 1.53 0.000
Correctly answered questions:
Q1: Interest over time 0.77 0.61 0.000 0.73 0.62 0.019
Q2: Simple interest 0.63 0.53 0.013 0.57 0.40 0.001
Q3: Compound interest 0.47 0.36 0.004 0.46 0.29 0.001
Q4: Time to repay 0.34 0.26 0.026 0.31 0.21 0.038
Behavioral Characteristics
Patience (0–10)a 5.15 5.76 0.003 5.98 6.08 0.696
Risk attitude (0–10)a 4.27 4.72 0.015 4.34 4.33 0.965
Present biased (= 1)b 0.13 0.21 0.012 0.10 0.16 0.086
Observations 339 299 638 440 127 567
Note: Table shows summary statistics split by young households (18–44) and old households (45 and above) as well
as homeowners and renters. Columns 3 and 6 report p-values from t-tests for the equivalence of means across age
groups and homeownership groups
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Table 5: Homeowner IV Probit Models
(1) (2) (3)
All
Households
Young
Households
Old
Households
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) 0.168* 0.022* 0.371*** 0.027*** −0.001 −0.026
(0.097) (0.106) (0.155)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) −0.018 −0.002 −0.039 −0.003 −0.001 −0.000
(0.019) (0.025) (0.027)
Present biased (= 1) −0.257* −0.054* −0.363** −0.087** −0.181 −0.038
(0.132) (0.178) (0.198)
Risk attitude (0–10) −0.017 −0.003 −0.028 −0.001 −0.017 −0.004
(0.020) (0.028) (0.029)
Demographics
Male (= 1) −0.111 −0.054 0.082 −0.056 −0.254* −0.065*
(0.111) (0.151) (0.149)
Education leaving age (years) 0.051** 0.008** −0.003 −0.007 0.086*** 0.018***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.032)
Household Finances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.291*** 0.057*** 0.297*** 0.056*** 0.320*** 0.068***
(0.059) (0.072) (0.101)
Household income2 −0.010*** −0.002*** −0.010** −0.002** −0.011 −0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) −0.228* −0.051* −0.417** −0.101** 0.017 0.003
(0.127) (0.190) (0.175)
Credit constrained (= 1) −0.427** −0.099** −0.293 −0.096 −0.645** −0.139**
(0.176) (0.230) (0.268)
Regional Housing Market Characteristics
5-year σ of mean house prices −0.120*** −0.028*** −0.249*** −0.058*** −0.077*** −0.018***
(0.023) (0.064) (0.027)
5-year growth of mean house prices 4.040*** 0.895*** 5.321*** 1.232*** 2.643*** 0.596***
(0.400) (0.713) (0.565)
Home ownership ratio in 2011 −0.001 −0.002 0.005 −0.001 −0.011 −0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.012)
House price to average income ratio −0.680*** −0.159*** −0.550*** −0.152*** −0.661*** −0.149***
(0.160) (0.218) (0.234)
Rental yield 0.115 0.030 0.403 0.107 −0.035 −0.006
(0.217) (0.281) (0.326)
Observations 1205 638 567
F-Statistic of rst stage 20.309 14.330 10.136
LR chi2 / F 359.494 207.045 96.541
Prob > chi2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.013 0.000 0.484
Baseline predicted probability 0.647 0.513 0.801
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit estimates and average marginal eects. * p < 0.1, ** p <
0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample includes all survey respondents (1), only young households
aged 18–44 (2) and old households aged 45 and above (3), respectively. The dependent variable for all models is a 1/0
dummy for which a value of 1 denotes the individual is an homeowner and a value of 0 denotes the individual is a
renter. First stage regression results are shown in Table A2. Additional controls not shown: 1/0 dummies for marital
status, dependent children, (spouse) employment status and age (in Column 1 only).
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Table 6: Homeowner IV Probit Model excluding “Don’t knows”
(1) (2) (3)
All
Households
Young
Households
Old
Households
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) 0.239 0.028 0.589*** 0.035*** −0.136 −0.032
(0.164) (0.134) (0.294)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) −0.021 −0.001 −0.040 −0.001 −0.003 −0.001
(0.023) (0.028) (0.034)
Present biased (= 1) −0.395*** −0.076*** −0.298 −0.070 −0.436* −0.086*
(0.155) (0.196) (0.238)
Risk attitude (0–10) −0.036 −0.005 −0.063** −0.005** −0.051 −0.010
(0.024) (0.031) (0.036)
Observations 926 490 436
F-statistic of rst stage 10.780 8.470 7.220
LR chi2 / F 286.198 206.184 75.279
Prob > chi2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.039 0.000 0.938
Baseline predicted probability 0.646 0.515 0.795
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit estimates and average marginal eects. * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample excludes respondents who answered “don’t
know” to the very rst literacy question and/or those who answered “don’t know” to three or more questions
(279 observations in total in Column 1). The dependent variable for all models is a 1/0 dummy for which a
value of 1 denotes the individual is an homeowner and a value of 0 denotes the individual is a renter. Young
households (2) are aged 18–44, old households (3) are aged 45 and above. Additional covariates as in Table 5.
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Table 7: Instrumental Variable Model with Selectivity Correction for
Mortgage Borrowing of Young Households (18–44)
(1) (2)
Loan-to-Value
Ratio
Loan-to-Income
Ratio
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Inverse Mills Ratio −5.887*** −0.443*** −4.974*** −0.186***
(0.854) (1.634)
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −0.955*** −0.016*** −0.797** −0.011**
(0.212) (0.361)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) 0.059** 0.001** 0.045 −0.002
(0.025) (0.034)
Present biased (= 1) 0.029 −0.024 0.026 −0.017
(0.145) (0.158)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.066 −0.013 0.033 −0.018
(0.049) (0.071)
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.786*** 0.021*** 0.580* −0.029*
(0.183) (0.332)
Education leaving age (years) 0.257*** 0.010*** 0.188 −0.008
(0.079) (0.127)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.598*** 0.018*** 0.562** 0.019**
(0.202) (0.254)
Credit constrained (= 1) 3.062*** 0.189*** 2.421** 0.014**
(0.526) (1.024)
Observations 638 638
F-statistic of rst stage 24.660 24.660
LR chi2 250.283 130.941
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.070 0.166
Baseline predicted probability 0.213 0.155
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models with selectivity
correction (the equivalent model without selectivity correction is shown in Table A4).
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Average marginal eects reported, standard errors
in parentheses. As in previous models, nancial literacy is instrumented by the math
level in school. The selection model is whether the individual holds a mortgage or
not, instrumented by the local house price to income ratio (the selection correction
term is shown by the inverse mills ratio). The dependent variable in Column 1 is a
1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the loan-to-value ratio of the household is
larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. Likewise, the dependent variable
in Column 2 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the loan-to-income ratio of
the household is larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. Sample includes
only young households. Additional controls not shown: 1/0 dummies for marital
status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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Table 8: Instrumental Variable Model with Selectivity Correction for Mortgage Characteristics
of Young Households (18–44)
(1) (2) (3)
Renanced within
past 3 years
Alternative Mortgage
Product
Adjustable Rate
Mortgage
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Inverse Mills Ratio −2.684*** −0.427*** −2.509*** −0.260*** 12.599* −0.147*
(0.608) (0.875) (7.061)
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −0.353** −0.015** −0.503** −0.042** 1.764** 0.020**
(0.164) (0.218) (0.840)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) 0.036 0.008 0.026 0.003 −0.011 −0.017
(0.028) (0.036) (0.053)
Present biased (= 1) −0.154 −0.032 0.601*** 0.073*** 0.131 −0.010
(0.189) (0.206) (0.182)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.138*** 0.027*** 0.033 0.003 −0.034 −0.018
(0.035) (0.044) (0.046)
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.142 −0.021 0.324 0.022 −0.073 0.033
(0.205) (0.271) (0.170)
Education leaving age (years) 0.056* 0.010* −0.019 −0.003 −0.030 −0.009
(0.029) (0.038) (0.023)
Household Finances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.219** −0.031** −0.212 −0.021 0.038 0.039
(0.112) (0.147) (0.124)
Household income2 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.001 −0.002 −0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.007 −0.003 0.563** 0.067** 0.434** 0.112**
(0.215) (0.229) (0.200)
Credit constrained (= 1) 1.167*** 0.167*** 1.010** 0.097** −0.226 −0.004
(0.384) (0.513) (0.213)
Observations 638 638 638
F-statistic of rst stage 25.740 25.740 25.740
LR chi2 54.590 47.357 307.769
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.134 0.526 0.274
Baseline predicted probability 0.134 0.072 0.224
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models with selectivity correction (the equivalent
model without selectivity correction is shown in Table A5). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Average marginal
eects reported, standard errors in parentheses. Financial literacy is instrumented by the math level in school.
The selection model is whether the individual holds a mortgage or not, instrumented by the local house price
to income ratio (the selection correction term is shown by the inverse mills ratio). The dependent variables are
1/0 dummy variables for, respectively: Column 1, whether the individual renanced the mortgage within the
last 3 years (= 1); Column 2, whether the individual holds an alternative mortgage product (= 1) or a standard
repayment mortgage; Column 3, whether the individual holds an adjustable rate mortgage (= 0) or a xed rate
mortgage. Sample includes only young households. Additional controls not shown: 1/0 dummies for marital
status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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Table A1: Regional Housing Market Characteristics
(1) (2) (3)
Full
Sample Homeowner Renter
5-year σ of mean house prices 13800 12500 16000
(8400) (8000) (9300)
5-year growth of mean house prices 0.17 0.24 0.04
Home ownership ratio in 2011 64.53 64.83 63.97
House price to average income ratio 3.96 3.94 4.01
Rental yield 6.05 6.06 6.04
Observations 1205 779 426
Note: Variables are calculated as follows: 5-year growth of mean house
prices and standard deviation of mean house prices are calculated from all
sales within the postcode district in which the household is located using
England and Wales Land Registry sales data. Home ownership ratio in 2011
is calculated at the regional level from UK Census data. This measures the
proportion of households in each region who live in a house which they
own, either with or without a mortgage. House price to average income
ratio in the region in which the household is resident is calculated using
house price data taken from the UK’s ocial house price sales index and
income data from the UK Oce for National Statistics. The simple gross
rental yield in the region of residence is calculated by the nancial con-
sulting agency BM Solutions. The rental yield is average annual rental
income divided by average property prices. Mean values reported, medians
in parentheses for nancial variables.
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Table A2: IV Probit Models First Stage
(1) (2) (3)
All
Households
Young
Households
Old
Households
β / SE β / SE β / SE
Instrument
Math level in school (1–5) 0.466*** 0.494*** 0.433***
(0.035) (0.051) (0.050)
Behavioral Characteristics
Patience (0–10) −0.032** −0.053*** 0.004
(0.014) (0.018) (0.020)
Present biased (= 1) −0.079 −0.006 −0.143
(0.100) (0.130) (0.162)
Risk attitude (0–10) −0.021 −0.052** 0.015
(0.015) (0.021) (0.022)
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.484*** 0.653*** 0.275***
(0.070) (0.096) (0.104)
Education leaving age (years) 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.068***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Household Finances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.155*** 0.132** 0.186***
(0.040) (0.054) (0.060)
Household income2 −0.007*** −0.007** −0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) −0.010 0.003 0.027
(0.096) (0.140) (0.134)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.039 0.220 −0.334
(0.131) (0.167) (0.214)
Regional Housing Market Characteristics
5-year σ of mean house prices 0.015 −0.014 0.032
(0.020) (0.032) (0.026)
5-year growth of mean house prices 0.377*** 0.417*** 0.304
(0.127) (0.156) (0.225)
Home ownership ratio in 2011 0.021*** 0.017** 0.019**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009)
House price to average income ratio 0.078 0.171 −0.065
(0.112) (0.156) (0.167)
Rental yield −0.071 −0.084 −0.072
(0.160) (0.219) (0.235)
Observations 1205 638 567
R2 0.274 0.306 0.260
F-statistic 20.309 14.330 10.136
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Baseline predicted probability 1.973 1.879 2.099
Note: Table shows the rst stage results of the instrumental variable probit models in
Table 5. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Sample
includes all survey respondents. The dependent variable for all models is the nancial
literacy score, ranging 0–4. Young households (2) are aged 18–44, old households (3)
are aged 45 and above. Additional controls not shown: 1/0 dummies for marital status,
dependent children, (spouse) employment status and age in Column 1.
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Table A3: Homeowner IV Probit Model excluding Homeowners without a Mortgage
(1) (2) (3)
All
Households
Young
Households
Old
Households
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) 0.191* 0.017* 0.369*** 0.031*** −0.134 −0.016
(0.109) (0.110) (0.198)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) −0.034 −0.004 −0.039 −0.001 −0.026 −0.005
(0.022) (0.028) (0.036)
Present biased (= 1) −0.166 −0.033 −0.268 −0.061 −0.160 −0.034
(0.147) (0.183) (0.235)
Risk attitude (0–10) −0.037 −0.006 −0.042 −0.004 −0.069* −0.015*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.038)
Observations 993 607 386
F-statistic of rst stage 14.500 11.600 8.730
LR chi2 / F 291.501 210.640 104.613
Prob > chi2 / F 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.025 0.000 0.330
Baseline predicted probability 0.566 0.473 0.676
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit estimates and average marginal eects. * p <
0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Sample excludes all homeowners who own their
properties without a mortgage. The dependent variable for all models is a 1/0 dummy for which a value of 1
denotes the individual is an homeowner and a value of 0 denotes the individual is a renter. Young households
(2) are aged 18–44, old households (3) are aged 45 and above. Additional covariates as in Table 5.
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Table A4: Instrumental Variable Model (without Selectivity Correction)
for Mortgage Borrowing of Young Households (18–44)
(1) (2)
Loan-to-Value
Ratio
Loan-to-Income
Ratio
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −0.752*** −0.011*** −0.652*** −0.024***
(0.135) (0.214)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) −0.069*** −0.006*** −0.065** −0.004**
(0.026) (0.029)
Present biased (= 1) −0.005 −0.041 0.046 −0.002
(0.188) (0.194)
Risk attitude (0–10) −0.104*** −0.038*** −0.110*** −0.034***
(0.036) (0.037)
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.538*** 0.024*** 0.394* −0.045*
(0.149) (0.211)
Education leaving age (years) 0.462*** 0.057*** 0.376*** 0.009***
(0.090) (0.135)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) −0.048 0.003 −0.019 0.017
(0.212) (0.218)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.401 0.203 0.204 0.053
(0.330) (0.314)
Observations 308 308
F-statistic of rst stage 12.210 12.460
LR chi2 108.088 97.565
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.036 0.079
Baseline predicted probability 0.414 0.339
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models (the equivalent
model with selectivity correction is shown in Table 7). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Average marginal eects reported, standard errors in parentheses. As in previous
models, nancial literacy is instrumented by the math level in school. The dependent
variable in Column 1 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the loan-to-value
ratio of the household is larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. Likewise,
the dependent variable in Column 2 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the
loan-to-income ratio of the household is larger than the 75th percentile in the distri-
bution. Sample includes only young households. Additional controls not shown: 1/0
dummies for marital status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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Table A5: Instrumental Variable Model (without Selectivity Correction) for Mortgage Char-
acteristics of Young Households (18–44)
(1) (2) (3)
Renanced within
past 3 years
Alternative Mortgage
Product
Adjustable Rate
Mortgage
β / SE Margin β / SE Margin β / SE Margin
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −0.096 −0.019 −0.380* −0.078* 0.573*** 0.030***
(0.180) (0.237) (0.109)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) 0.018 0.007 −0.024 −0.005 −0.030 −0.030
(0.036) (0.046) (0.034)
Present biased (= 1) −0.164 −0.053 0.912*** 0.176*** −0.043 0.000
(0.233) (0.247) (0.210)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.106*** 0.034*** 0.002 −0.000 −0.008 −0.019
(0.040) (0.049) (0.036)
Demographics
Male (= 1) −0.219 −0.077 0.025 0.008 −0.067 0.113
(0.207) (0.267) (0.186)
Education leaving age (years) 0.084** 0.026** −0.030 −0.006 −0.055* −0.014*
(0.036) (0.044) (0.031)
Household Finances
Household income (£10,000s) 0.054 0.016 −0.030 −0.005 −0.064 −0.001
(0.104) (0.120) (0.090)
Household income2 −0.005 −0.001 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) −0.163 −0.051 0.641** 0.123** 0.761*** 0.304***
(0.269) (0.290) (0.253)
Credit constrained (= 1) 0.658* 0.205* 0.402 0.078 0.554 0.277
(0.379) (0.411) (0.394)
Observations 308 308 308
F-statistic of rst stage 12.260 14.690 12.360
LR chi2 28.589 35.145 94.862
Prob > chi2 0.007 0.001 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.849 0.925 0.002
Baseline predicted probability 0.301 0.165 0.485
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models (the equivalent model with selectivity
correction is shown in Table 8). * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Average marginal eects reported, standard
errors in parentheses. Financial literacy is instrumented by the math level in school. The dependent variables
are 1/0 dummy variables for, respectively: Column 1, whether the individual renanced the mortgage within
the last 3 years (= 1); Column 2, whether the individual holds an alternative mortgage product (= 1) or a stan-
dard repayment mortgage; Column 3, whether the individual holds an adjustable rate mortgage (= 0) or a
xed rate mortgage. Sample includes only young households. Additional controls not shown: 1/0 dummies for
marital status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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Table A6: Instrumental Variable Model with Selectivity Correction for
Mortgage Borrowing of Young Households (18–44) excluding
“Don’t knows”
(1) (2)
Loan-to-Value
Ratio
Loan-to-Income
Ratio
Inverse Mills Ratio −4.713*** −0.250*** −18.384*** −0.227***
(1.202) (6.542)
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −0.901*** −0.014*** −2.378** −0.062**
(0.320) (0.945)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) 0.087** 0.001** −0.056** −0.009**
(0.040) (0.024)
Present biased (= 1) 0.264 0.010 0.068 0.036
(0.173) (0.185)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.039 −0.015 −0.065 −0.025
(0.058) (0.069)
Demographics
Male (= 1) 0.612*** 0.021*** 0.098 −0.044
(0.189) (0.198)
Education leaving age (years) 0.283*** 0.017*** 0.080 −0.006
(0.096) (0.085)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) −0.254 −0.027 −0.150 0.023
(0.177) (0.192)
Credit constrained (= 1) −0.006 −0.012 0.043 −0.056
(0.205) (0.276)
Observations 490 490
F-statistic of rst stage 29.220 29.220
LR chi2 143.854 255.828
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.115 0.313
Baseline predicted probability 0.192 0.141
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models with selectivity
correction. This table corresponds to Table 7, but here the sample excludes all respon-
dents who answered “don’t know” to the very rst literacy question and/or those who
answered “don’t know” to three or more questions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Average marginal eects reported, standard errors in parentheses. Financial literacy
instrumented by the math level in school. The selection model is whether the indi-
vidual holds a mortgage or not, instrumented by the local house price to income ratio
(the selection correction term is shown by the inverse mills ratio). The dependent
variable in Column 1 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the loan-to-value
ratio of the household is larger than the 75th percentile in the distribution. Likewise,
the dependent variable in Column 2 is a 1/0 dummy variable indicating whether the
loan-to-income ratio of the household is larger than the 75th percentile in the distri-
bution. Sample includes only young households. Additional controls not shown: 1/0
dummies for marital status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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Table A7: Instrumental Variable Model with Selectivity Correction for Mortgage Characteris-
tics of Young Households (18–44) excluding “Don’t knows”
(3) (4) (5)
Renanced within
past 3 years
Alternative Mortgage
Product
Adjustable Rate
Mortgage
Inverse Mills Ratio −20.482*** −1.108*** −6.117*** −0.384*** −20.940*** −0.017***
(2.920) (1.765) (2.252)
Financial Literacy
Financial literacy score (0–4) −2.719*** −0.123*** −1.150** −0.053** 2.750*** 0.021***
(0.340) (0.502) (0.331)
Behavioural Characteristics
Patience (0–10) 0.038** −0.003** 0.122** 0.007** −0.056 −0.024
(0.019) (0.057) (0.049)
Present biased (= 1) −0.009 −0.062 0.899** 0.100** −0.017 0.014
(0.176) (0.406) (0.138)
Risk attitude (0–10) 0.028 0.014 0.094 0.004 −0.030 −0.016
(0.032) (0.065) (0.036)
Demographics
Male (= 1) −0.221 −0.092 0.586 0.018 0.199 0.049
(0.184) (0.395) (0.133)
Education leaving age (years) −0.084 −0.018 0.202 0.001 0.085 0.018
(0.058) (0.232) (0.059)
Household Finances
Household income (£10,000s) −0.018 0.036 0.099 0.009 0.062 0.033
(0.090) (0.085) (0.070)
Household income2 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001 0.000 0.001 −0.001
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Financial Circumstances
Recent income loss (= 1) 0.156 −0.025 0.253 0.056 −0.085 0.122
(0.145) (0.466) (0.279)
Credit constrained (= 1) −0.173 0.016 −0.075 −0.016 0.178 −0.003
(0.170) (0.302) (0.170)
Observations 490 490 490
F-statistic of rst stage 25.240 25.240 25.240
LR chi2 484.811 106.693 782.203
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test of exogeneity 0.329 0.498 0.408
Baseline predicted probability 0.128 0.081 0.238
Note: Table shows results from instrumental variable probit models with selectivity correction. This table cor-
responds to Table 8, but here the sample excludes all respondents who answered “don’t know” to the very rst
literacy question and/or those who answered “don’t know” to three or more questions. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01. Average marginal eects reported, standard errors in parentheses. Financial literacy instrumented by
the math level in school. The selection model is whether the individual holds a mortgage or not, instrumented
by the local house price to income ratio (the selection correction term is shown by the inverse mills ratio). The
dependent variables are 1/0 dummy variables for, respectively: Column 1, whether the individual renanced
the mortgage within the last 3 years (= 1); Column 2, whether the individual holds an alternative mortgage
product (= 1) or a standard repayment mortgage; Column 3, whether the individual holds an adjustable rate
mortgage (= 0) or a xed rate mortgage. Sample includes only young households. Additional controls not
shown: 1/0 dummies for marital status, dependent children and (spouse) employment status.
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